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T
he literature concerned with dynamic ﬁscal policy has evolved in two
main directions over the last 20 years or so. On the one hand, there
is a large literature on optimal taxation. In the context of a standard
neoclassical growth model with inﬁnitely-lived individuals, Chamley (1986)
and Judd (1985) establish that an optimal income-tax policy entails taxing
capital at conﬁscatory rates in the short run and setting capital income taxes
equal to zero in the long run. Only labor income should be taxed in the
long run. On the other hand, most applied work concerned with the dynamic
impactofﬁscalpolicyusesthelife-cycleframework(Auerbach,Kotlikoff,and
Skinner [1983], Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987], and many others, surveyed
in Kotlikoff [1998]). Unfortunately, the prescriptions that emanate from the
former framework do not necessarily generalize to the latter.
This article reviews the basic results obtained under both the inﬁnitely-
lived agent model and the life-cycle model. The ﬁrst section, which presents
a nontechnical introduction to the optimal taxation literature, discusses the
optimal taxation problem and the intuition behind the results obtained from
both types of models. Section 2 more formally presents the results for the
inﬁnitely-lived agent model and Section 3 presents results for the life-cycle
economy.
The review of the literature presented here complements that of Chari and
Kehoe (1999) andAtkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999). The main focus of their
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papers is on the inﬁnitely-lived agent model. As the title of Atkeson, Chari,
and Kehoe’s article indicates, they emphasize that taxing capital is a bad idea.
Theirconclusion, especiallyforlife-cycleeconomies, isbasedonveryspecial
cases. Our review suggests instead that there is no real consensus regarding
theoptimaltaxoncapitalincome. Rather, wedemonstrateseveralempirically
relevant settings in which optimal capital taxes are non-zero, both in the short
run and in the long run.
1. A REVIEW OF OPTIMAL TAXATION
Statement of the Ramsey Problem
The problem of ﬁnding the optimal manner in which to ﬁnance a given stream
of expenditures has a long tradition in public ﬁnance. The statement of the
optimal taxation problem given here follows Ramsey’s 1927 seminal paper,
whichformallyrecognizedthatindividualsandﬁrmsreacttochangesinﬁscal
policy. When considering alternative ﬁscal policies, the government has to
take into account that individuals and ﬁrms will behave in their own best
interest, taking as given whichever ﬁscal policy the government has chosen.
Each ﬁscal policy implies a feasible allocation of goods and factor services,
along with prices, that fully reﬂects the optimal reaction of individuals and
ﬁrms; that is, each ﬁscal policy implies a competitive equilibrium allocation.1
Given a welfare criterion, which the government uses to evaluate different
allocations,theRamseyproblemforthegovernmentistopicktheﬁscalpolicy2
that generates the competitive equilibrium allocation giving the highest value
of the welfare criterion.
An equivalent way of formulating the Ramsey problem is to let the gov-
ernment pick an allocation directly—rather than a set of tax rates—but to
restrict the set of allocations from which the government can choose. This set
of allocations can be constructed as follows. Pick an arbitrary ﬁscal policy.
Under this ﬁscal policy, the optimal behavior of individuals and ﬁrms gener-
ates a competitive equilibrium allocation. This allocation is one element in
the set of allocations from which the government can choose. We refer to
such an allocation as an implementable allocation: to implement this partic-
ular allocation as a competitive equilibrium, the government simply needs to
choose the ﬁscal policy that generated it. By repeating this process for all
possible ﬁscal policies, we can construct the set of all possible allocations that
the government can implement. The resulting Ramsey problem then consists
of picking, among all implementable allocations, the one that maximizes a
1 Note, however, that many ﬁscal policies may generate the same competitive equilibrium.
This is the case, in particular, when the government has more tax instruments than are needed to
generate a particular allocation.
2 Or one of them if there are many.A. Erosa and M. Gervais: Optimal Taxation 25
welfare criterion. In many situations, this alternative way of stating the Ram-
sey problem, referred to as the primal approach in the literature, turns out to
be much more convenient than the dual problem of choosing tax rates.3
The Ramsey problem poses some additional challenges when its focus
is on dynamic ﬁscal policies. Implicit in the statement of the problem is
the following sequence of actions by the government, individuals, and ﬁrms.
First, at initial date zero, the government announces a time path for the ﬁscal
policy instruments. Taking this path of tax rates as given, individuals and
ﬁrms then choose their paths of consumption, savings, leisure, and inputs in
order to maximize utility and proﬁts. When we get to period one, however,
it is quite possible that the government will choose to revise its path of tax
rates if given the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, individuals and ﬁrms
will behave differently in period zero if they know that the government has an
incentive to modify the path of tax rates in the future. This problem, known
as the time inconsistency of policies, is particularly severe in inﬁnitely-lived
agent models, but it is also present in life-cycle economies.4
Inﬁnitely-LivedAgent Models
Two central prescriptions emerge from the solution to the Ramsey problem in
representative, inﬁnitely-lived agent models. The ﬁrst is that capital income
should not be taxed in the long run. This result makes sense if we understand
that a positive tax on the return from today’s savings effectively makes con-
sumption next period more expensive than consumption in the current period.
In inﬁnitely-lived agent models, then, a positive (and constant) tax on capital
income in the steady state implies that the implicit tax rate of consumption
in future periods increases without bound. On the other hand, the relevant
elasticity of demand for consumption at all dates is constant.5 Taxing dated
consumption at different rates thus violates the general public ﬁnance princi-
ple that tax rates should be inversely proportional to demand elasticities. It
follows that the capital income tax should be zero.
The second important aspect of optimal taxation in inﬁnitely-lived agent
models stems directly from the time inconsistency of optimal policies dis-
cussed above. Prior to date zero, which is the date when the government
chooses the path of ﬁscal instruments, individuals presumably operate under
3 On the primal approach, see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Lucas and Stokey (1983).
4 The classic reference on time inconsistency of optimal plans is Kydland and Prescott (1977).
5 In general equilibrium, the relevant elasticity does not have a readily recognizable repre-
sentation. If the individuals’ utility function is additively separable over time, then this elasticity
depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution as well as some cross elasticity between
consumption and leisure. In any case, the fact that both consumption and leisure are constant in
steady state is sufﬁcient to make this elasticity constant.26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the assumption that the old ﬁscal policy will last forever. As far as the govern-
ment is concerned, individuals’previous actions translate into the economy’s
initialconditionsatdatezero,assummarizedbyindividuals’initialassethold-
ings (capital and government debt). Since these assets were accumulated in
the past, at date zero individuals will supply their capital to ﬁrms regardless
of the ﬁscal policy: this factor is inelastically supplied. As a result, taxing the
return on these assets perfectly imitates a (nondistortionary) lump-sum tax.
Withoutanyrestrictionsonthesizeofthattax,itisefﬁcientforthegovernment
to tax initial asset holdings at conﬁscatory rates.6 In this way, the government
can ﬁnance its stream of expenditures through the return on the levied capital
and avoid distortionary taxes in the future. Indeed, if the return on that capital
issufﬁcientlylargetoﬁnanceallfuturegovernmentexpenditures, aParetoop-
timal allocation is achieved because there is no need to ever use distortionary
taxes.
The time inconsistency problem exists because when the government
switches to a new ﬁscal policy, individuals are “surprised” and cannot re-
act to the government’s action. As such, the time inconsistency problem and
the optimality of the front-loading policy are directly related. The former is
not, however, conﬁned to the initial switch in ﬁscal policy. As long as the path
of taxes initially announced by the government involves distortionary taxes
at some future date, the government has an incentive to redesign its original
plan in order to take advantage of whatever lump-sum tax (capital levy) be-
comes available in the future. Economists have dealt with the general time
inconsistency problem by assuming that the government has access to some
commitment device, or a commitment technology, that allows the government
to commit itself once and for all to the sequence of tax rates announced at date
zero. In other words, the commitment technology prevents the government
from revising the path of ﬁscal instruments over time. The optimality of con-
ﬁscating initial holdings of ﬁnancial assets, however, still remains an integral
part of the solution to the Ramsey problem.
To avoid this arguably trivial solution to the optimal taxation problem, it
is usually assumed that the government faces exogenous bounds on the size of
feasibletaxrates. Forexample,Chamley(1986)assumesthattaxrateshaveto
lie between zero and one. Chamley shows that the optimal policy under some
assumptions, with respect to preferences, entails taxing capital income at the
highest possible rate for a ﬁnite amount of time—while the lump-sum aspect
of this tax outweighs its distortionary cost—and setting the capital income tax
equal to zero thereafter.7 Although this exogenous upper bound assumption
6 Similarly, it is efﬁcient for the government to renege on all government debt outstanding
at date zero.
7 In discrete time models, there is a period of transition during which the tax on capital
income is strictly between zero and one. There is no such transition period in Chamley’s original
result since it was derived in a continuous time model.A. Erosa and M. Gervais: Optimal Taxation 27
mayseemrealistic,itisalsocompletelyarbitraryandhasapronouncedimpact
on the solution to the optimal taxation problem: The higher the bound is, the
morecapitalthegovernmentaccumulatesduringtheﬁrstfewperiodsafterthe
switch in ﬁscal policy and the lower the tax rate on labor income individuals
have to face in the future, including the steady state. More generally, the
size of the bound determines the magnitude of the welfare gains achieved by
switching to the taxes prescribed by the Ramsey problem.
Life-Cycle Economies
The result developed above holds because the elasticity of consumption ex-
penditures exhibits steady state constancy. In turn, this elasticity is constant
precisely because consumption and leisure are themselves constant in steady
state, which need not be the case in life-cycle economies.8 In fact, one of the
main reasons why economists use the life-cycle model is precisely because
observed lifetime consumption and leisure proﬁles are not ﬂat. Because the
behavior of individuals has this life-cycle pattern, there is no reason to expect
the relevant consumption elasticities to be constant.
It follows from this reasoning that consumption at different ages should
be taxed at different rates. Alternatively, capital income should be taxed or
subsidized at rates that depend on the age of the individual supplying the
capital.9 Through a similar argument, optimal labor income tax rates also
varywiththeageoftheindividualsupplyinglabor. Althoughthesearguments
indicate that the relative capital and labor income tax rates should vary over
the lifetime of individuals, they leave open the question of how to determine
the level at which these tax rates should be set. We will return to this question
below.
The choice of a welfare function to evaluate different implementable al-
locations is not as straightforward in life-cycle economies as it is in inﬁnitely-
lived agent models. The fact that standard inﬁnitely-lived agent models are
populated by a single representative individual dictates that the benevolent
government or planner would use the representative agent’s utility function as
the welfare function. A life-cycle economy, however, involves many hetero-
geneous agents: each generation has (at least) a representative member, and a
new generation is born every period. At a minimum, relative weights need to
be assigned to each individual. It is usually assumed that these weights take
8 This remains true even in inﬁnitely-lived agent economies with heterogeneous consumers.
See Judd (1985) for details.
9 Recall that taxing consumption tomorrow more (less) than today is equivalent to taxing
(subsidizing) capital income tomorrow.28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the form of a discount factor, so that the planner places an ever decreasing
weight on future generations.10
Irrespective of the precise form of these welfare weights, the impact of a
capital levy is very different in a life-cycle environment than in an inﬁnitely-
lived agent economy, simply because a capital levy explicitly involves a re-
distribution between generations: The individuals on whom the burden of a
capitallevyfallsaredifferentfromthosewhobeneﬁtfromlowerdistortionary
taxation in the future. For example, consider the impact of conﬁscating the
assets of a (possibly retired) individual who, at date zero, is in his last period
of life. Under this front loading policy, this individual’s consumption would
be very low (it may be zero) and so would his utility; his utility is not af-
fected by the lower tax rates that future generations would face. Since this
individual’s utility has a positive weight in the welfare function, the value of
the government’s objective would be driven down considerably by the front
loading policy. This is not to say that the government would not tax initial
assets at all, but rather that the extent to which the government will do so is
limited, at least relative to what is optimal in inﬁnitely-lived agent models.
Accordingly, there is no need to impose arbitrary bounds on feasible tax rates
in life-cycle economies.
Recall that the level of the long-run labor income tax in the inﬁnitely-
lived agent model is a function of these exogenous bounds on feasible tax
rates. The size of these bounds determines how much capital the government
accumulates during the transition, and thus the tax revenue that needs to be
collected in the long run and the tax rate on labor income. Since there is no
need to impose such bounds in life-cycle models, what, then, determines the
tax revenue that needs to be collected in the long run? The answer lies in the
weightsthattheplannerputsondifferentgenerations. Intheusualcase,where
these weights are represented by a discount factor, the steady-state amount of
government debt and the amount of tax collection are entirely driven by the
size of the discount factor. A relatively low discount factor indicates that
the government puts low weights on future generations relative to current
generations. In such cases, the government will tend to have a relatively high
amountofaccumulateddebtinthelongrunandwillneedtocollectarelatively
high amount of taxes. Similarly, a high discount factor implies low (or even
negative) government debt and that a small amount of taxes is to be collected.
10 Note that these weights have to get smaller over time—they have to converge to zero—for
the welfare function to be well deﬁned. For example, if all generations had the same weight, all
(positive) allocations would give the same welfare value (inﬁnity).A. Erosa and M. Gervais: Optimal Taxation 29
2. AN INFINITELY-LIVEDAGENT ECONOMY
Consider an economy populated by a large number of identical individuals
with inﬁnite lives.11 Each period, individuals are endowed with one unit
of productive time. The representative individuals’ preferences are ordered
according to the following utility function
∞  
t=0
βtU(ct,1 − lt). (1)
Equation (1) expresses that in each period of their inﬁnite lives, individuals
careaboutconsumption,denotedct,andleisure,(1−lt);thelattercorresponds
to the total endowment of time minus time devoted to work (lt). The discount
factor 1 >β>0 is used by individuals to discount utility in future periods
to utility in the current period. We assume that the utility function U is
strictly increasing in both arguments, is strictly concave, and satisﬁes the
standard Inada conditions.12 Two commonly used algebraic forms for the
utility function will be considered in the text. The ﬁrst is a utility function
which is separable between consumption and leisure:
U(c,1 − l) =
c1−σ
1 − σ
+ V(1 − l), (2)
where the function V satisﬁes the above stated conditions and 1/σ is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which measures the degree to which
individuals are willing to substitute consumption over time. The second func-
tional form we consider is a Cobb-Douglas utility function:




where η = θ(1 − σ). In equation (3), 1/σ has the same interpretation as it
did under the separable utility function and θ measures the intensity of leisure
in individuals’preferences.
Each period, individuals face the budget constraint
ct + at+1 = wtlt + (1 + rt)at, (4)
where wt is the after-tax wage rate, rt is the after-tax interest rate, and at+1 is
the amount of resources carried over from period t to period t + 1. Letting
pt be the Lagrange multiplier on the time-t budget constraint, the ﬁrst order
11 This section draws from Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999).
12 The Inada conditions state that the marginal utility of consumption or leisure is very high
(low) at very low (high) consumption levels, that is, limc→0 U(c,1−l) = liml→1 U(c,1−l) =∞
and limc→∞ U(c,1−l) = 0. Note that leisure time cannot exceed one since working time cannot
be negative.30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
conditions for individuals are
βtUct − pt = 0, (5)
βtUlt + ptwt = 0, (6)
−pt + (1 + rt+1)pt+1 = 0, (7)
where Uct and Ult denote the derivative of U with respect to ct and lt respec-
tively, that is, the marginal utility of consumption and leisure. One could
use these conditions to obtain the optimal consumption and leisure demands
of individuals. Naturally, these demand functions would depend on the ﬁs-
cal policy chosen by the government, and they would represent the reaction
functions that the government takes into account when formulating a Ramsey
problem. Weshowbelowthattheseﬁrstorderconditionscanbeusednotonly
to construct the budget constraint but also to construct a constraint that can be
imposed on the government when formulating a Ramsey problem where the
government chooses allocations rather than tax rates.
There is a single produced good in our economy that can be used as
consumption (private or public) or capital. For the goods-producing sector of
our economy, we assume that the input-output technology is represented by a
neoclassicalproductionfunctionwithconstantreturnstoscale, yt = f(k t,l t),
whereyt,kt,andlt denotetheaggregate(orpercapita)levelsofoutput,capital,
and labor, respectively. Proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms implies that capital and
labor services are paid their marginal products: before-tax prices of capital
and labor in period t are given by ˆ rt = fkt − δ, where 0 <δ<1i st h e
depreciation rate of capital, and ˆ wt = flt.
Feasibility requires that total (private and public) consumption plus in-
vestment be less than or equal to aggregate output
ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt + gt ≤ yt, (8)
where gt stands for date-t government consumption and all aggregate quanti-
ties are expressed in per capita terms.
Toﬁnanceitsgivenstreamofexpenditures,thegovernmenthasaccesstoa
set of ﬁscal policy instruments and to a commitment technology to implement
itsﬁscalpolicy. Thesetofinstrumentsavailabletothegovernmentconsistsof
governmentdebtandproportionaltaxesonlaborincomeandcapitalincome.13
The date-t tax rates on capital and labor services are denoted by τk
t and τw
t ,
respectively. In per capita terms, the government budget constraint at date t
is given by
(1 +ˆ rt)bt + gt = bt+1 + (ˆ rt − rt)at + ( ˆ wt − wt)lt, (9)
13 In this framework, consumption taxes need to be ruled out to make the problem interesting
since they can be used in conjunction with labor income taxes to perfectly imitate a levy of initial
holdings of assets. See Chari and Kehoe (1999) for details.A. Erosa and M. Gervais: Optimal Taxation 31
where bt represents government debt issued at date t, wt ≡ (1 − τw
t ) ˆ wt,
and rt ≡ (1 − τk
t )ˆ rt. Equation (9) expresses that the government pays its
expenditures, which are composed of outstanding government debt payments
(principal plus interest) and other government outlays, either by issuing new
debt, by taxing interest income, or by taxing wage income.
In the spirit of Ramsey, the government takes individuals’ optimizing
behavior as given and chooses a ﬁscal policy to maximize a given welfare
criterion. Since there is but a single representative agent in this economy, a
natural way for the government to evaluate different allocations is to use the
representative individual’s utility function. If we let π denote a ﬁscal policy
and denote ct(π) and lt(π) the solution to the consumer problem as a function





βtU(ct(π),1 − lt(π)), (10)
subjecttofeasibility(8)andthegovernmentbudgetconstraint (9)forallt ≥ 0.
This Ramsey problem corresponds to the dual. Note that the problem is fairly
difﬁcult to analyze because any tax instrument enters all demand functions.
Given this difﬁculty, the primal approach is much more tractable.
The PrimalApproach
To construct a Ramsey problem where the government chooses allocations
rather than tax rates, we must restrict the set of allocations from which the
government can choose. This set should include only allocations that are
competitive equilibrium under some ﬁscal policy. To construct this set, we
use the fact that for any given ﬁscal policy, the competitive equilibrium must
satisfy the consumer’s optimality conditions, including the budget constraint,
as well as those of the ﬁrm. Using these optimality conditions, we can derive
a condition that competitive equilibria must satisfy.
Our ﬁrst step is to iterate on the budget constraint (4) to express this










(ct − wtlt) = (1 + r0)a0. (11)
Theterminsidethesquarebracketsisashorthandtoexpressthemultiplication
ofmanyterms, 1
















βt(Uctct + Ultlt) = A0, (14)




Equation (14) is referred to as the implementability constraint. It can be
shownthatanycompetitiveequilibriumallocationhastosatisfythisconstraint,
and that any feasible allocation satisfying the implementability constraint is
a competitive equilibrium (see Chari and Kehoe [1999] for details). Impos-
ing this constraint on the government’s problem accomplishes exactly what
we wanted: It ensures that any allocation picked by the government can be
implemented as a competitive equilibrium.
We can now state the Ramsey problem in terms of allocations. This prob-
lem consists of maximizing welfare, given by the representative consumer’s
utility function (1), subject to feasibility (8) and the implementability con-
straint (14). NotethatbyWalras’slaw, iftheindividual’spresentvaluebudget
constraint (11) holds under a feasible allocation, then the government’s bud-
get constraint (9) is also satisﬁed. Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier on the
implementability constraint (14) and deﬁne the pseudo-welfare function W to
include the implementability constraint
Wt = U(ct,1 − lt) + λ(Uctct + Ultlt). (15)
Themultiplierλwillbestrictlypositiveifitisnecessaryforthegovernmentto
usedistortionarytaxation. Thetermmultiplyingλessentiallygivesabonusto
date-t allocations that bring in extra government revenues, thereby relieving
otherperiodsfromdistortionarytaxation,andthesametermimposesapenalty






βtWt − λA0, (16)
subject to feasibility (8). The form the above problem takes, the primal,i s
very similar to a ﬁrst-best planning problem except that the pseudo-welfare









Ult[1 + λ(1 + Hl
t )]






Uct[1 + λ(1 + Hc
t )]
Uct+1[1 + λ(1 + Hc
t+1)]
= β(1 + fkt+1 − δ), (18)











Equation (17) equates the government’s marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure at date t to the marginal product of labor of that date.
Similarly, equation (18) sets the government’s marginal rate of substitution
between consumption today and consumption tomorrow equal to the return
on capital (net of depreciation). Note that the government’s marginal rate of
substitution,unlikethatofanindividual,takestheimplementabilityconstraint
into account. Also, the government cares about before-tax prices, whereas
individuals face after-tax prices.
Atkeson, Chari, andKehoe(1999)refertothetermsHc andHl asgeneral
equilibrium elasticities since they capture the relevant distortions for setting
the capital and labor income tax rates in general equilibrium. Notice that if
Hc
t = Hc
t+1, then equation (18) implies that
Uct
Uct+1









= β(1 + rt+1) = β(1 + (1 − τk
t+1)ˆ rt+1). (22)
For both equations (21) and (22) to hold, τk




14 Note that the ﬁrst-order conditions at time zero are different from the above equations
since consumption at date zero appears inside the term A0.34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
condition in order for the labor decision of individuals (−Ult/Uct = wt)t o
be compatible with that of the government (equation (17)). We have just
demonstrated the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In our inﬁnitely-lived agent model, (i) the optimal tax rate on
labor income at date t is different from zero unless Hc
t = Hl
t , and (ii) the




Chamley’s (1986) celebrated result on the optimality of not taxing capital
in the long run follows directly from Proposition 1. Suppose that the Ram-
sey allocation converges to a steady state where consumption and leisure are
constant by deﬁnition. It follows immediately that in such a steady state, the
function Hc
t is also constant, which implies that the optimal capital income
tax is zero in the long run.
Proposition 1 also implies that for utility functions that are separable in
consumption and leisure (so that Uc,l = 0) and have a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (so that Uc,cc/Uc is constant), the capital income tax
should be zero in all but the ﬁrst period. Of course, capital should be taxed at
a conﬁscatory rate in the ﬁrst period regardless of preferences since this tax
perfectly imitates a lump-sum tax.
Proposition 2 Under utility functions of the form given by (2), the optimal
capital income tax in our inﬁnitely-lived agent model is zero for t>1.
Chamley also shows, under the same separable utility function, that im-
posing a bound on feasible tax rates implies the following for the optimal
tax on capital income: The tax rate should be equal to the upper bound for a
ﬁnite amount of time, after which it should be equal to zero. In discrete time
models, there is a period between the two regimes where the tax rate is strictly
between zero and the upper bound. The intuition for this result is that taxing
capital income has two effects. While the capital income tax partially imitates
a lump-sum tax because the initial stock of capital is given, it also introduces
a distortion on the savings decision. As a result, the lump-sum aspect of the
tax dominates for periods sufﬁciently close to date zero, and the distortionary
aspect of the tax dominates thereafter.
Theintuitionfortheaboveresultremainsintactundermoregeneralutility
functions, inthesensethatearlytaxationofcapitalincomeispreferredtolater
taxation. It is less clear, however, whether capital income should be taxed
throughout the transition. In particular, for the Cobb-Douglas utility function
(3), the optimal capital income tax is zero only in the long run.A. Erosa and M. Gervais: Optimal Taxation 35
3. A LIFE-CYCLE ECONOMY
We now consider a life-cycle economy.15 This economy is similar to the
inﬁnitely-lived agent economy considered in Section 2, except it is populated
by overlapping generations of individuals with ﬁnite lives. Individuals still
make consumption and labor/leisure choices in each period so as to maximize
their lifetime utility, and ﬁrms still operate a neoclassical production technol-
ogy. The payments received by individuals on their factors (capital and labor)
are subject to proportional taxes, which we now assume can be conditioned
on age.
Individuals live (J +1) periods, from age 0 to age J. At each time period,
anewgenerationisbornandisindexedbydateofbirth. Atdatezero,whenthe
change in ﬁscal policy occurs, the generations alive are −J,−J + 1,...,0.
Inordertotaketheseinitialgenerationsintoaccountinthefollowinganalysis,
it will prove convenient to denote the age of individuals alive at date zero by
j0(t). For all other generations we set j0(t) = 0, so that for any generation
t, j0(t) = max{−t,0}. One can thus think of j0(t) as the ﬁrst period of
an individual’s life affected by the date zero switch in ﬁscal policy. We let
µj = 1/(J + 1) represent the share of age-j individuals in the population.
The labor productivity level of an age-j individual is denoted zj.
We let ct,j and lt,j, respectively, denote consumption and time devoted to
work by an age-j individual who was born in period t. Note that ct,j and lt,j
actually occur in period (t + j). Similarly, the after-tax prices of labor and
capital services are denoted wt,j and rt,j, respectively. The problem faced by
an individual born in period t ≥− J is to maximize lifetime utility subject to




βj−j0(t)U(ct,j,1 − lt,j), (23)
s.t. ct,j + at,j+1 = wt,jzjlt,j + (1 + rt,j)at,j,j = j0(t),...,J. (24)
This problem mimics the consumer’s problem from Section 2, except for
the need to index all variables by age. We denote Ut(π) the indirect utility
function, that is, the maximum lifetime utility obtained by an individual from
generation t under ﬁscal policy π.
Let pt,j denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget con-
straint (24) faced by an age-j individual born in period t. The necessary and
sufﬁcientconditionsforasolutiontotheconsumer’sproblemaregivenby(24)
15 This section draws from Erosa and Gervais (2000).36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and
βj−j0(t)Uct,j − pt,j = 0, (25)
βj−j0(t)Ult,j + pt,jwt,jzj ≤ 0, with equality if lt,j > 0, (26)
−pt,j + pt,j+1(1 + rt,j+1) = 0, (27)
at,J+1 = 0, (28)
j = j0(t),...,J, where Uct,j and Ult,j denote the derivative of U with respect
to ct,j and lt,j, respectively.16
The feasibility constraint is still given by (8). However, the date-t ag-
gregate levels of consumption and labor input—the latter being expressed in
efﬁciency units—are now obtained by adding up the weighted consumption
(or effective labor supply) of all individuals alive at date t, where the weights









The set of instruments available to the government consists of govern-
ment debt and proportional, age-dependent taxes on labor income and capital
income.17 The date-t tax rates on capital and labor services supplied by an
age-j individual (born in period (t − j)) are denoted by τk
t−j,j and τw
t−j,j,
respectively. In per capita terms, the government budget constraint at date
t ≥ 0 is given by




(ˆ rt − rt−j,j)µjat−j,j +
J  
j=0
( ˆ wt − wt−j,j)µjzjlt−j,j, (29)
where wt,j ≡ (1 − τw
t,j) ˆ wt+j and rt,j ≡ (1 − τk
t,j)ˆ rt+j. Equation (29) has
exactly the same interpretation as equation (9) in the inﬁnitely-lived agent
model.
16 We assumed in Section 2 that the labor supply was always between zero and one. In the
context of a life-cycle economy, however, the labor supply can realistically hit a corner solution
if labor productivity gets sufﬁciently small. For example, individuals may become less productive
as they age and choose to retire.
17 Recall that consumption taxes had to be ruled out in the inﬁnitely-lived agent model be-
cause they could perfectly imitate a levy of initial holdings of assets. Because the government’s
incentive to conﬁscate initial holdings of assets is endogenously limited in life-cycle economies,
we could allow for consumption taxes. However, it can be shown that a consumption tax would
be a redundant instrument. See Erosa and Gervais (2000) for details.A. Erosa and M. Gervais: Optimal Taxation 37
Because of the presence of many heterogeneous individuals in this econ-
omy, the choice of a welfare function is not as straightforward here as it is
in the inﬁnitely-lived agent model. Below, we assume that social welfare is
deﬁnedasthediscountedsumofindividuallifetimewelfares(asinSamuelson
[1968] and Atkinson and Sandmo [1980]). In other words, the government




where 0 <γ<1 is the intergenerational discount factor and Ut(π), as was
deﬁned earlier, is the indirect utility function of generation t as a function




As before, we need to impose restrictions so that any allocation chosen by
the government can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. In life-
cycle models, each generation has its own implementability constraint. The
implementability constraints are obtained by using the consumers’ optimal-
ity conditions (25) through (27) and acknowledging the fact that factors are
paid their marginal products to substitute out prices from consumers’budget
constraints (24). After adding up these budget constraints, the resulting im-




βj−j0(t)(Uct,jct,j + Ult,jlt,j) = At,j0(t), (31)
where At,j0(t) ≡ Uct,j0(t)(1 + rt,j0(t))at,j0(t). It should be emphasized that im-
plicit in this implementability constraint is the existence of age-dependent tax
rates. Additionalrestrictionsneedtobeimposedforanallocationtobeimple-
mentable with age-independent taxes. In other words, the set of allocations
from which the government can pick depends crucially on the instruments
available to the government.
The Ramsey problem in this life-cycle economy consists of choosing an
allocation to maximize the discounted sum of successive generations’utility,
subject to each generation’s implementability constraint (31) as well as the









γ tWt.38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The pseudo-welfare function Wt is deﬁned as in Section 2 to include genera-
tion t’s implementability constraint in addition to its lifetime utility. If we let
γ tλt betheLagrangemultiplierassociatedwithgenerationt’simplementabil-









+ λt(Uct,jct,j + Ult,jlt,j)
 
− λtAt,j0(t). (32)




In this section we show that the solution to the Ramsey problem generally
features non-zero tax rates on labor and capital income and demonstrate how
these rates vary with age. In particular, and in contrast with inﬁnitely-lived
agent models, if the Ramsey allocation converges to a steady state solution,
optimalcapitalincometaxeswillingeneraldifferfromzeroeveninthatsteady
state. Although the main results of this section hold more generally, we will
restrict attention to steady states for ease of exposition.
Let γ tφt denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the time-t feasi-
bilityconstraint(8). Thesteadystatesolutionischaracterizedbythefollowing
equations:





Ulj[1 + λ(1 + Hl
j)]
Ucj[1 + λ(1 + Hc
j)]




Ucj[1 + λ(1 + Hc
j)]
βUcj+1[1 + λ(1 + Hc
j+1)]












as well as the feasibility and implementability constraints (8) and (31).
Theﬁrstorderconditionwithrespecttocapital,equation(33),impliesthat
the solution to this Ramsey problem has the modiﬁed golden rule property:
The marginal product of capital (net of depreciation) equals the discount rateA. Erosa and M. Gervais: Optimal Taxation 39
applied to successive generations (1/γ − 1) (see Samuelson [1968]). Equa-
tion (34) equates the government’s marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumptionandleisureofanage-j individualtotheeffectivemarginalproductof
labor of that same individual. Similarly, equation (35) sets the government’s
marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and consumption
tomorrow equal to the return on capital (net of depreciation).
We now derive necessary conditions under which the Ramsey allocation
features zero taxation of either labor or capital income. Any optimal ﬁscal
policy has to satisfy the consumer’s optimality conditions, and we derive
the necessary conditions by comparing the optimality conditions from the
consumer’s problem to those of the Ramsey problem.
Combiningtheconsumer’sﬁrstorderconditionsforconsumption(25)and





= zjwj = zj ˆ w(1 − τw
j ), (38)
which corresponds to the usual optimality condition that the marginal rate of
substitution between labor and consumption be equal to the relative price of
labor faced by the consumer. Compare equation (38) to its analogue from
the Ramsey problem (34). Using the fact that ˆ w = fl, the tax rate on labor






1 + λ + λHl
j
. (39)
Since λ is generally different from zero, this tax rate on labor income will be
equal to zero only if Hl
j = Hc
j.
The same logic applies to the tax rate on capital income. For this case,
consider the consumer’s ﬁrst order condition for consumption (25) at age j




= 1 + rj+1 = 1 + (1 − τk
j+1)ˆ r. (40)
Equation (40) corresponds to the usual intertemporal condition that sets the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and consumption
tomorrow equal to the relative price of the same commodities, which is equal
to the gross interest rate. The government’s counterpart of (40) is given by
equation (35). Using these two equations and the fact that ˆ r = fk − δ,w e
obtain40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
1 +ˆ r
1 + (1 − τk
j+1)ˆ r
=
1 + λ + λHc
j
1 + λ + λHc
j+1
, (41)
which implies that the tax rate on capital income is different from zero unless
Hc
j = Hc
j+1. These results are summarized in the following proposition.




rate on capital income at age j + 1 is different from zero unless Hc
j = Hc
j+1.
Proposition 3 is very similar to Proposition 1, but with age of individuals
replacing the time period. Essentially, prescriptions that hold in the transition
ofinﬁnitely-livedagentmodelsholdinthesteadystateoflife-cycleeconomies.
Since zero-capital income tax is merely a special case in the transition of
inﬁnitely-lived agent models, we should expect the same prescription in the
steady state of life-cycle economies.
TheintuitionastowhythecelebratedChamley-Juddzero-capitaltaxresult
does not extend to life-cycle economies should be clear. Since consumption
and leisure are constant in the steady state of inﬁnitely-lived agent models,
Hc is constant; thus, zero-capital income taxation is optimal regardless of the
formoftheutilityfunction. Incontrast, consumptionandleisurearegenerally




income taxes will generally not be equal to zero in the long run. Obviously,
if the economy is speciﬁed so that individuals’behavior features no life-cycle
elements, i.e., labor supply and consumption are independent of age, then
optimal taxation works as in inﬁnitely-lived agent models in the sense that
capital income is not taxed.
Proposition 4 In our life-cycle model, if (i) zj = z, j = 0,...,J and (ii)
γ = β, then it is not optimal to tax capital income in the long run.
The proof of Proposition 4 is fairly intuitive. From the ﬁrst order con-
dition with respect to capital (33), when γ = β, the steady state return on
capital coincides with individuals’rate of time preference, i.e., fk − δ =ˆ r =
1/γ − 1 = 1/β − 1. The consumer’s optimization conditions (25) through
(27) then imply that, given a constant productivity proﬁle, consumption and
leisure do not depend on age in steady state. In turn, the absence of life-cycle
behavior implies that the function Hc
j does not depend on age, which, follow-
ing Proposition 3, is sufﬁcient for the optimal capital income tax rate to be
zero in steady state.
Proposition 4 is a generalization of a result inAtkeson, Chari, and Kehoe
(1999) that they use to prescribe zero-capital income taxation in overlapping
generationseconomies. Itshouldbenoted,however,thattheconditionsstatedA. Erosa and M. Gervais: Optimal Taxation 41
inProposition4haveempiricallyunappealingimplications. Inparticular,they
imply that individuals consume their labor earnings period by period. As a
result, individuals do not accumulate any assets and the entire stock of capital
is owned by the government.
Optimal capital income taxes are also zero when preferences are such that
uniform commodity taxation over the lifetime of individuals is optimal. The
separable utility function (2) is one form under which the capital income tax
is zero. Because this utility function is separable in consumption and leisure
(so that Uc,l = 0) and has a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(so that Uc,cc/Uc is constant), the general equilibrium elasticity (the function
Hc) is constant. Relative to Proposition 2, the general equilibrium elasticity
here is not only independent of time but of age as well.
Proposition 5 Under utility functions of the form given by (2), the optimal
capital income tax in our life-cycle model is zero for t>1.
Proposition5,combinedwithProposition2,soundslikegoodnews. Ifwe
were conﬁdent that individuals’preferences were reasonably well represented
by utility functions that are separable in consumption and leisure, then we
would be reasonably conﬁdent that prescribing zero-capital income tax was
the right thing to do. There is, however, an important caveat: The result in
Proposition 5 relies heavily on the government’s ability to age-condition tax
rates. If the government were constrained to use tax rates that are indepen-
dent of age, then the optimal capital income tax would no longer be zero.18
Furthermore, applied work in public ﬁnance is usually conducted with utility
functions that are not separable in consumption and leisure.19
UndertheCobb-Douglasutilityfunction,itisstraightforwardtoshowthat
optimal capital income taxes in this case are zero in the long run only under
very restrictive conditions, as stated in Proposition 4. The principles guiding
the optimal manner in which to tax capital over the lifetime of individuals are
stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 For utility function of the form given by (3), the tax rate on
capital income at age j + 1 is positive if and only if lj+1 <l j.
18Although showing this result is beyond the scope of this paper, the intuition is that the
government will use a non-zero capital income tax to imitate the optimal age-dependent labor
income tax (see Erosa and Gervais [2000] for details). Alvarez, Burbidge, Farrell, and Palmer
(1992) derive a similar result in a partial equilibrium setting. This type of ﬁnding is reminiscent
of results in Stiglitz (1987) and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), where the government taxes
capital income when it is constrained to use tax rates that are independent of individuals’ skill
levels.
19Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), for example, use a nested CES utility function with in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 0.25 and intratemporal elasticity of substitution equal
to 0.8. Both elasticities would have to be equal to unity for the CES utility function to be sep-
arable in consumption and leisure.42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Proof. The proof follows directly from the deﬁnitions of Hc
j (equation (36))
under utility function (3). Since Hc





1 + λ + λ(−σ − η/(1 − lj))
1 + λ + λ(−σ − η/(1 − lj+1))
. (42)
Notice that τk









j+1 > 0ifandonlyiflj+1 <l j.
By taxing (subsidizing) capital, the government makes consumption and
leisure in the future more (less) expensive than today. Proposition 6 suggests
the government uses capital income taxes to smooth individuals’ leisure and
consumption proﬁles over their lifetimes. Under Cobb-Douglas utility, the
share of consumption in an individual’s total expenditures is constant, so that
consumption and leisure always move together over time. If consumption
and leisure are high tomorrow relative to today, then the government will tax
the return on today’s savings at a positive rate tomorrow. By doing so, the
government gives individuals an incentive to consume more and save less
today, and thus to consume less tomorrow.
An implication of the principle of optimal taxation developed in Propo-
sition 6 is that capital income should not be taxed during retirement. This
follows directly from the fact that labor supply is constant during retirement.
Notice,however,thatleisuretimeduringretirementistaxedindirectlybecause
the return on savings is taxed prior to retirement.
4. CONCLUSION
Wehavereviewedoptimaltaxationinbothaninﬁnitely-livedagentmodeland
a life-cycle economy. Our review shows that there is no consensus regarding
the optimal tax on capital income. Although the optimal capital income tax
is invariably zero in the long-run equilibrium of inﬁnitely-lived agent mod-
els, the conditions under which that is the case in life-cycle economies are
very stringent. Even under a separable utility function, the capital income tax
will only be zero if the government has access to age-dependent labor income
taxes. Furthermore, both models suggest that capital income should be taxed
at non-zero rates during the transition unless individuals have separable pref-
erences between consumption and leisure. Thus, the strong conclusions and
recommendations of much of this literature must be treated with caution.A. Erosa and M. Gervais: Optimal Taxation 43
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